讀金融時報學英文》積極等待 好事到來

【經濟日報／Donald Sull】 In highly volatile markets, a company's success or failure is often attributed to luck. Turbulent markets throw out oppor-tunities whose timing, nature and magni-tude managers can neither predict nor control. The same holds true for threats. In such a competitive casino, you place your bets and hope for the best. It is better to be lucky than good. 在變幻莫測的市場，一家公司的成敗常常要靠運氣。動盪的市場蘊含著機會，但對於企業管理者而言，機會出現的時機、本質以及重要程度，既無法預測，也無法控制。市場挑戰也是如此。 在這個競爭激烈的賭場上，你下了賭注，就會盼望出現最好的結果。有時候，做得好還不如運氣好。 For the past six years I have studied more than 20 pairs of comparable companies in unpredictable industries such as telecom-munications, airlines and enterprise software and in countries such as China and Brazil. By pairing similar companies, I showed how they responded differently to the same un-foreseen threats and opportunities. 過去六年，我研究了20多對彼此相似的公司。它們是處於諸如電信、航空、企業軟體等難以預測的行業，且地處中國和巴西這類國家。 透過類似公司之間的比較可以看出，在面對同樣不可預見的挑戰和機會時，它們如何做出不同反應。 I found the more successful companies we re luckier, in the sense that time and again they responded more effectively to unexpect-ed shifts in regulation, technology, competi-tion, macroeconomics or other volatile fac-tors. Such luck is too important to leave to chance. The most successful companies ex-emplified "active waiting", an approach to strategy in highly unpredictable markets that consists of anticipating and preparing for opportunities and threats that executives can neither fully predict nor control. 我發現，愈是成功的公司就愈幸運。在某種意義上，它們總能更有效地應對監管、技術、競爭、總體經濟或其他不穩定因素的意外變化。 這種幸運太重要了，容不得白白浪費。「積極等待」策略彰顯在最成功的公司上。這是在極難預料的市場上採取的一種策略，要求經營者對既無法充分預知又不能控制的機會與挑戰進行期待和準備。 But all opportunities are not equal. In volatile markets, companies face countless small and mid-sized opportunities and the periodic golden opportunity - a chance to create value disproportionate to resources in-vested in a short period of time. Typical golden opportunities include acquisition of a large competitor to gain global scale, such as the Royal Bank of Scotland's acquisition of NatWest; explosive demand in an emerging market such as China or India; or pioneering a new product or ser-vice such as the iPod. 不過，機會並不都一樣。在變幻的市場，企業面臨著不計其數的中小型機會，以及周期性的黃金機會，後者可以在短期內創造出大大高於所投入資源的價值。 典型的黃金機會包括併購一個大型競爭對手從而獲得全球性業務規模，如蘇格蘭皇家銀行併購國民西敏銀行；還包括在中國或印度等新興市場出現的爆炸性需求；或者是率先推出iPod這樣的新產品或服務等。 Golden opportunities occur only when external circumstances throw open several windows of opportunity at the same time. Consider the opportunity for middleware - software that links a compa-ny's applications - which IBM and BEA converted into billion-dollar businesses. Sev-eral developments occurred at once: the in-ternet created demand for software that could get applications to talk to one another; available technology was up to the task; early leaders such as NCR and Novell were distracted by other markets; the paucity of venture capital funding prevented many start-ups chasing the same market. 黃金機會只在外部環境同時打開幾扇機會之窗時才會出現。想一想中介軟體———-那種連接一個公司各種應用程式的軟體所帶來的機會，IBM和BEA兩家公司將之轉化成了數十億美元的業務。當時，好幾種情況同時出現了：網路的發展促使人們需要一種軟體讓公司的各種應用程式之間可以交流；當時的技術已能夠解決這一需求；NCR和Novell等早期領軍企業被其他市場分散了精力；創投資金數量太小，阻止了許多新興企業在同一市場中角逐。 Timing is everything in these circum-stances. Had IBM or BEA entered the mar-ket a year or two earlier, customers'pain would have been less acute and the tech-nology fix less developed. A few years later, and new entrants flush with venture capital cash might have established a lead. 在這些情況下，把握時機最為重要。如果IBM和BEA早一兩年進入這個市場，消費者的需求就不會那麼強烈，而技術也不會那麼發達。如果晚幾年，手握大量創投資金的新進者就可能已經確立領導地位。 Managers can neither predict nor control golden opportunities. But they can prepare their companies to capitalise on one when it arrives. The trick lies not in heroic efforts in the middle of a golden opportunity, but in the quiet actions taken during periods of relative calm between the storms. 管理者們既不能預測也無法控制黃金機會。但他們可以讓公司做好準備，以便在某個機會到來時一把抓住。箇中訣竅不在於當黃金機會到來時如何英勇努力，而是在於風暴之間的相對平靜期默默進行準備。 （本文摘自培生出版《讀金融時報學英文3-深度評論》） 【2006/10/15 經濟日報】